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Abstract
What explains people’s preferences for state intervention in so-
cial policies? Conducting a cross-section analysis on individual-level
survey data, we highlight the link between the economic position of
agents and their specific demand toward redistribution. Controlling
for a number of factors usually found to impact individual preferences
in the literature, we take the egoistic motives for redistribution se-
riously and focus on the role played by the occupational status of
individuals in shaping their preferences. Thus, (i) we estimate the
relative importance of economic factors in terms of current and ex-
pected gain, allowing for social mobility experience and risk aversion.
Further, (ii) we try to identify which socio-political groups could be
formed on the basis of their preferences for redistribution. Finally,
(iii) we highlight differences between European countries as it comes
to the grouping of agents.
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1 Introduction
What explains people’s preferences for state intervention in social policies
or more specifically preferences for redistributive policies? In this paper, we
conduct a cross-country analysis on the determinants of preferences for redis-
tribution in Europe using individual-level survey data. We take the egoistic
motives for redistribution seriously and estimate the relative importance of
economic factors in terms of current and expected gain, allowing for social
mobility concerns and risk aversion. To do that, we use ISSP (International
Social Survey Programme) data on four European countries (Great Britain,
Sweden, France and Germany) that represent ideal cases relative to the wel-
fare state in Europe, and test the empirical validity of the main propositions
of the literature using ordered logit regressions. We substantively assess the
relative importance of each explanatory variable and conduct a series of ro-
bustness checks.
Throughout the analysis, our focus is on the role played by the occu-
pational status of individuals in shaping their preferences for redistribution.
Adopting a political economy viewpoint on the more general question of what
determines redistributive policies, we further try to identify which socio-
political groups could be formed on the basis of their preferences for redistri-
bution. Indeed, the changing weight of social groups and the degree of homo-
geneity that exists inside groups crucially influences the political outcome1.
The analysis of demand concerning social policies and the identification of
social groups that formulate this demand are then necessary to be able to
determine, in a comparative perspective, the support for potential reforms
concerning the welfare state in Europe (Castanheira et al., 2006).
There is a rapidly growing literature on the determinants of preferences
for redistribution, with a large variety of arguments proposed to explain
differences in attitudes towards the welfare state. This goes from purely pe-
cuniary factors (Meltzer and Richard, 1981) to purely cultural factors (Algan
and Cahuc, 2006), through subjective social positioning (Hirschman, 1973) or
expectations of social mobility (Benabou and Ok, 2001). Our contribution to
the existing literature is threefold: (i) We substantively assess the importance
of the variables identified in the literature, infer a hierarchy in the arguments
and emphasize the supremacy of economic factors in shaping preferences for
1See on this point the political economy model of Pagano and Volpin (2001, 2005), and
its extension by Amable and Gatti (2004, 2007).
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redistribution; (ii) We identify the different social groups who might sup-
port redistribution according to their position on the labour market; (iii) We
highlight differences between countries as it comes to the grouping of agents
(hence potential coalitions) based on their policy preferences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
literature on the determinants of preferences for redistribution. Section 3
explains our empirical strategy, the data used and the careful construction
of variables. Section 4 illustrates the econometric results, while Section 5
conducts a series of robustness checks. Section 6 concludes. Technical details
on the econometric specification can be found in the appendix, along with
descriptive statistics of the data and the results of robustness checks.
2 Literature
A recent body of the economic literature addresses the problem of the for-
mation of preferences for redistribution.
The standard viewpoint is to consider a purely pecuniary factor as de-
termining individual preferences (Meltzer and Richard, 1981): individuals
whose income is below the mean income of the population ask for redistrib-
ution, given that they will directly benefit from it; symetrically, individuals
whose income is above the mean do not favour redistribution as they are net
contributors. Therefore, if the median income is below the mean income in
the population, a majority of voters will be in favour of redistribution. In
their study of the differences between the level of welfare state in the United
States and in four European countries (France, Germany, Sweden and the
UK), Alesina and Glaeser (2004) show that the empirical validity of this
argument is highly controversial.
Adding the “prospect of upward mobility” to enrich the standard model
and assuming that a change in politics can not happen to often, Benabou and
Ok (2001) leave a room for individuals whose income is just below the mean
to rationally oppose redistributive policies. Then, there may be a “preference
for inequality” (Suhrcke, 2001) linked to the fact that a majority of voters
expect an upward mobility in the future, thus a net cost to redistribution
(Clark, 2003; Senik, 2005). A similar argument has been recently tested by
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) using an objective mobility matrix.
But how do individuals estimate their chance of future mobility? Piketty
(1995) assumes a learning process that leads individuals to take into account
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not only their current income, but also their personal mobility history to
compute their future income. Using their personal mobility experience, in-
dividuals, who do not know the true role of effort in determining income,
update their initial beliefs (randomly distributed) while evaluating the cost
of redistribution. Therefore, an individual who believes that effort is re-
warded by the society and who experiences an upward mobility would have
an incentive to oppose any redistributive policy and to pursue its effort to in-
crease his social position. These beliefs, in the long run self-fulfilling2, imply
multiple equilibria leading for instance the US to promote effort (thus to op-
pose redistribution) and European countries to reward chance (thus to favour
redistributive policies). The standard income effect usually assumed in the
Public Choice theories with an egoistic median voter may thus be false, since
the effect comes from endogeneous beliefs about the role of effort3. More
recently, Fong (2001), Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Benabou and Ti-
role (2006) have revisited the relationship between collective beliefs on the
relative importance of individual effort in one’s success and the demand for
redistribution.
The relative income does also play a role in determining preferences, as
pointed out by Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) who take advantage of the
“tunnel effect” originated by Hirschman (1973). In this approach, beliefs are
strongly related to the way other people move in the society. The tunnel
refers to a situation where a car driver is blocked in a traffic jam. If the
queue beside him is moving, whereas his queue is stationary, the individual
first has a positive reaction: the traffic jam is probably close to the end,
and his queue will move very soon, too. But if, after a while, his queue
still does not move, the individual is not only unstatisfied to be stuck, but
his discontent is raised by the fact that other drivers next to him do move.
This double effect is called the tunnel effect. Attitudes of individuals clearly
depend on their expectations, and their expectations rely on the observation
of others. Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) and Corneo and Gru¨ner (2000,
2002) find empirical support for this relative social mobility argument, using
Russian data for the former, and international survey data (ISSP 1992) for
the latter.
Finally, a growing body of the literature focusses on behavioural and
2See Piketty (1998) for a theoretical explanation of the persistence of inequalities.
3See Piketty (1999) for a test on French data.
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cultural values as determinants of preferences for redistribution4. Alesina
and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln (2007) argue that there is a long lasting impact of
political regimes on collective beliefs about redistribution. The authors take
advantage of the natural experiment of East Germany to assess the impact
of Communism on people’s preferences for redistribution. Alesina, Glaeser
and Sacerdote (2001) and Roemer and Van der Straeten (2005, 2006) focus
on the racial conflict that could explain the refusal of redistribution, when
individuals expect migrants to take all the benefit from it. Clark and Lelkes
(2005) and Scheve and Stasavage (2006) highlight the role of religion as a
substitute to public redistribution. The hypothesis tested by the authors is
that the social distress due to an economic shock (e.g. unemployment) is
dampened if the individual belongs to a social network. Religion might be
such a network. In all these studies, the insurance motive of redistributive
policies (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962) is tackled5.
In the following, we test the empirical validity of these propositions on a
sample of European countries. Adopting a political economy viewpoint on
the more general question of what determines redistributive policies, we try
to identify which socio-political groups could be formed on the basis of their
preferences for redistribution. Throughout the analysis, the hypothesis is
that preferences for redistribution rely on the economic positioning of agents
on the labour market. Thus, conducting a cross-country analysis on the
determinants of preferences for redistribution in Europe, we contribute to
the existing literature in three ways. First, we assess the relative importance
of the factors identified to impact preferences for redistribution and reveal
the key role played by economic variables, as compared to cultural factors.
Second, we identify the different occupational groups who might support
redistributive policies. Third, we highlight differences between countries,
especially as it comes to the grouping of agents who support redistribution.
4See Algan and Cahuc (2006) for an international comparison using World Value Sur-
vey and ISSP (1991, 1998) that explains differences in welfare states and labour market
institutions by differences in civic attitudes; See Amable (2008) for an empirical evalua-
tion on European Social Survey data of the importance of cultural factors relative to other
“materialists” factors in the individual support for the European social model.
5See Rehm (2005) for an empirical test on European Social Survey data of diverse
insurance motives (globalization, deindustrialization) as determinants of preferences for
redistribution.
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3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Estimation Process
We proceed to an ordered logit regression, since the variable to be explained
encompasses discrete choices that can be easily ordered on a Likert scale6.
Ordered models assume the existence of threshold values, thus implying an
ordering to the categories of the dependent variable. More precisely, a latent
variable is supposed to capture the outcome, following a decision rule based
on those cut-points parameters that need to be estimated (see the appendix
for a formal explanation on this).
The equation to estimate can be defined as follows:
Y ∗i = γDi + χEi + δMi + φVi + ηC + i (1)
where vectors γ, χ, δ, φ, η and  are parameters to estimate, and Y ∗i is
the latent variable, i.e. the intensity of preferences for redistribution.
D is a vector of individual socio-demographic characteristics (age, sex,
marital status). E is a vector that measures the socio-economic position of
individuals (type of occupation, current income, risk aversion). This vector
includes also a binary variable for individuals who are union members. M is
a vector of binary variables that captures the personal social mobility experi-
ence and the perception of mobility relative to the father, or alternatively the
subjective social position. V is a vector of dummies that captures cultural
values, here reduced to the religion of individuals and the intensity of their
religiosity. In the finer study of Germany, we include a dummy for living
in former East Germany, in order to capture a potential long lasting effect
of the communist regime on preferences. Finally, C is a vector of country
6The Likert scale is commonly used to measure the degree of satisfaction of individuals.
This type of scale uses a classification in 5 points, that goes from the strong agreement
to the simple agreement, indifference, disagreement, and strong disagreement to rank
attitudes. Even though some scholars treat this scale as being an interval scale (hence
applying OLS estimates), we do not know whether the distances between the different
alternatives are equal (i.e. the gap between “strongly agree” and “agree” is not necessarily
of the same magnitude as the gap between “agree” and “indifferent”). Therefore, the
presence of a Likert scale calls for the use of categorical dependent variable regression
models (CDVMs). Unlike the OLS, CDVMs are not linear.
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dummies, and  is the error term.
We do not observe Y ∗i , but a variable Yi that takes the values 1 to 5 and
increases with the individual support for redistribution. In particular, we
have:
Yi = j if αj−1 ≤ Y ∗i < αj (2)
for j = 1, ..., 5 where αj are cut points to estimate, assuming that α0 =
−∞ and α5 = +∞.
The interpretation of categorical variables estimates is not straightfor-
ward (King et al., 2000; Tomz et al., 2003). Coefficients give us the marginal
effect of a unit variation of the independent variable on the value of the latent
variable. However, we do not know the value of the latent variable, but only
its cut points. Therefore, a first interpretation of results is done through the
interpretation of the sign of coefficients and of their statistical significance.
Notice that within the same regression, the magnitude of coefficients is com-
parable. We thus interpret the relative impact of independent variables in
terms of odds ratios (i.e. for a unit increase in x, the odds of a lower outcome
compared with a higher outcome are changed by a factor β, holding all other
variables constant). We further assess the substantive effect of coefficients
by computing predicted probabilities for a few ideal types (Long and Freese,
2006).
3.2 Data
Our micro-econometric analysis is based on the ISSP dataset “Social Inequal-
ity III” (International Social Survey Programme - 1999). Questions of the
survey deal with the political demand, votes, social and economic character-
istics of individuals (between 500 and 1000 respondents per country). We
select four countries in the dataset, that correspond to four ideal cases relative
to the welfare state in Europe, according to the literature (Esping-Andersen,
1990; Amable, 2003 and 2005): Great Britain, which has the lowest level
of welfare state and is based on a Beveridgean individualistic logic; Sweden,
which has the highest level of welfare state and an universalist and egalitarian
system; France and Germany that are the two biggest European countries
and have a welfare state based on the insurance system originated by Bis-
marck.
8
To measure attitudes towards redistribution, we assume that agents are
sincere revealers of their preferences, while answering to the following survey
question:
“What is your opinion of the following statement: It is the re-
sponsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income
between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.”
For presentational purpose, the original scale has been inverted, from
cons to pros in five categories: 1 Strongly Disagree, 2 Disagree, 3 Neither
Agree Nor Disagree, 4 Agree, 5 Strongly Agree. The distribution of answers
is shown in the Tables below (see also Figures 1 and 2 in the appendix).
Table 1: Distribution of answers by country
% Germany GB Sweden France Total Sample
Strongly disagree (SD) 5 2 6 6 5
Disagree (D) 17 13 13 14 14
Don’t know (NN) 17 17 22 17 18
Agree (A) 42 48 36 30 37
Strongly agree (SA) 19 19 24 33 25
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Question: “It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in
income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.”. Source:
ISSP 1999 - Social Inequality III
Table 2: Distribution of answers by occupation
% SD D NN A SA Total
Managers 12 24 18 29 16 100
Professionals 10 20 18 33 20 100
Associate professionals 5 12 20 38 25 100
Clerks 3 13 16 40 29 100
Service workers 2 9 18 41 30 100
Agricultural workers 7 8 20 38 28 100
Craftmen 3 14 19 39 25 100
Machine operators 3 9 14 42 32 100
To be continued next page. . .
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Table 2: Distribution of answers by occupation (cont’)
% SD D NN A SA Total
Elementary workers 4 6 16 39 35 100
Total sample 5 14 18 37 25 100
Question: “It is the responsibility of the government to reduce
the differences in income between people with high incomes and
those with low incomes.”. Source: ISSP 1999 - Social Inequality
III
3.3 Testing the Argument
We further select in our dataset a series of explanatory variables, each of
which corresponding to a possible explanation of the formation of prefer-
ences. The causal link involved is briefly exposed below.
Occupation ISCO-88 (International Standard Classification of Occupations7):
The type of occupation, which depends on skills level and specialization, is
assumed to influence preferences of agents regarding social policies. Indeed,
according to Iversen and Soskice (2001), specific jobs are more threatened by
globalization and macro shocks than others. Moreover, specialized workers
have more difficulties to find vacancies that correspond to their speciality
(Estevez-Abe et al., 2001). Consequently, agents with specific skills are sup-
posed to be more supportive of the welfare state, compared to agents with
general skills. To test their argument, the authors construct a linear skill
specificity index based on ISCO classification. However, we do not see any
reason why all specific skills -by definition specific to a job or a sector- would
be threatened in the same way by globalization or macro shocks. Thus, the
linearity of the effect does not seem intuitive to us. Moreover, the skill speci-
ficity index of the authors is negatively related to the level of education of
7As EUROSTAT (1994, p.1) clearly explains: “ISCO-88 organises occupations in an
hierarchical framework. At the lowest level is the unit of classification -a job- which is
defined as a set of tasks or duties designed to be executed by one person. Jobs are grouped
into occupations according to the degree of similarity in their constituent tasks and duties.
[...] For the purpose of aggregating occupations into broadly similar categories at different
levels in the hierarchy, ISCO-88 introduces the concept of skill, defined as the skill level
-the degree of complexity of constituent tasks- and skill specialisation -essentially the field
of knowledge required for competent performance of the constituent tasks.”.
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workers (Cusack et al., 2006, p.371).
Thus, to ease the argument and the interpretation, we simply cluster the
ISCO indicator into the 9 major groups indicated by the ILO and strongly re-
lated to the education degree of individuals and the level of in-the-job training
they received8. Importantly, by entering occupation major groups as binary
variables into the regression, we are able to assess which occupations can be
grouped together according to the similarity of their political demand. The
major groups we use are the following: Manager, Professional, Associate
professional, Clerk, Service worker, Craftman, Machine operator, Elemen-
tary worker. Agricultural workers are excluded from our sample, since their
size is too small and their composition too heterogeneous to infer robust re-
sults.
Income The higher income an individual has, the less he needs public fund-
ing, hence the less he should be in favor of social spending (Meltzer and
Richard, 1981). On the other hand, the higher income an individual has, the
more he has to loose providing he falls into unemployment, if he does not
earn replacement benefits. Hence, the linearity of his preferences towards
redistribution is not theoretically obvious and calls for more precise tests at
the empirical level (Moene and Wallerstein, 2001). Therefore, current income
enters the regression in quintiles, from the lowest (Q1) to the highest (Q5)
level of income9.
Risk Aversion The employment status (workers in the private sector, self-
employed and publicly employed) is used to proxy risk aversion. Self-employed
workers are supposed to be less risk averse than average (Alesina and La
Ferrara, 2005), while publicly employed people are supposed to be more risk
averse than average. Indeed, public employees are less likely to loose their
job: Job tenure is more insured in the public sector than in the private sec-
tor. This is especially true in France and in Sweden. Assuming a decision
process while choosing their work status, those individuals who have cho-
sen to be publicly employed should correspond to more risk averse people.
8See Tables 11 and 12 in the appendix.
9In order to ease comparison and interpretation, the income variable is considered in
quintiles and labeled in the country money. However, keeping the original coding does
not affect the results. On the contrary, quintiles being less precise than the original data,
this gives power to the analysis, as current income remains an important regressor while
considered in quintiles.
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Furthermore, the level of public employment directly relies on the size of
government, and more particularly on the size of social programs. Therefore,
public employees have a direct interest in supporting redistributive policies.
Unions We measure the belonging to a trade union or employers’ associa-
tion by a dummy for union membership. The idea is that union members
are better informed about the costs and benefits of redistribution. Moreover,
union members are supposedly willing to influence public policy decisions, by
giving power to an organization that gathers common interests (Olson, 1965).
Religion Religious denomination (dummies for Catholic and Protestant)
and church attendance are used to assess the validity of the literature results
in our sample (Clark and Lelkes, 2005; Scheve and Stasavage, 2006).
Social Class In order to infer the potential impact of the subjective social
ranking on attitudes towards redistribution, we use the self-positioning of
agents on a social scale that ranks from 1 (top) to 10 (bottom). We define
two binary variables: upper class (positioning from 1 to 4) and lower class
(from 7 to 10). Individuals who positioned themselves on the 5th and 6th
ranks are considered to belong to the middle class (our reference category).
We thus expect a negative effect of individuals who express the feeling to
belong to the upper class on preferences for redistribution, and a positive
effect of individuals having the feeling to belong to the lower class, relative
to those who belong to the middle class.
Social Mobility We use two different specifications to assess the social mo-
bility argument. The first one is the self-assessment by individuals of their
job prestige, compared to their father’s. This specification can also be found
in Corneo and Gru¨ner (2002) and in Alesina and La Ferrara (2005). The
second specification we use is the personal history of individuals, concerning
their social mobility. To construct this variable, we use the previous question
on the self-positioning of individuals on a social scale: Indeed, the question
is asked twice, for today and regarding 10 years ago (ex post assessment).
We calculate the difference between both answers to measure the subjective
social mobility of respondents and classify the newly created variable in 3 cat-
egories (upward mobility, immobility, downward mobility). This is a direct
test of the agrument of Piketty (1995), stating that people who experienced
an upward mobility should oppose redistribution, while people who expe-
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rienced a downward mobility should support redistribution. Our reference
category gathers people who consider they did not experience any mobility
within the last 10 years.
As a set of control, we introduce the following variables: Gender (dummy
for female), age and age squared (to allow for concavity), and marital status
(dummy for individuals who are married or live as married).
An important variable that could have been introduced into our analy-
sis is the education level of individuals. Because it is already included into
our ISCO variable, it has not been put into the regression to avoid multi-
collinearity. However, if tested separately, we find the same result as in the
literature: The more educated an individual is, the less does he favor redis-
tribution. The explanation for this is twofold. First, the more he studies, the
more he is informed, hence the more he knows about the cost and benefits of
redistribution; Second, the more he studies, the higher his productivity and
wage, thus the more he pays taxes while employed. Therefore, the less he
will favor redistribution that represents a net cost for him10. Finally, another
interesting explanatory variable would be the work status of individuals (un-
employed, disabled, retired, part-time, etc.). Unfortunately, the high number
of missing points on this question constrained us to let this set of variables
out of the regression.
4 Results
We first run a pooled country regression that constrains the residual variance
to be the same, hence assuming the homogeneity of unobserved variables.
While presenting the results of our estimates, we systematically provide odds
ratios to compare the impact of explanatory variables in a meaningful way.
Indeed, odds ratios allow to interpret a unit increase in xk as a change in
the odds of a lower outcome compared with a higher outcome by a factor
βk, holding all other variables constant. We next propose a few ideal types
and compute their predicted probabilities to fall into one or the other cate-
gory of our dependent variable. Econometric results are provided in Table 3
10If we further assume that long-term unemployment risk is decreasing with education,
this effect is emphasized.
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for the pooled country regressions, using ordered logit estimation technique.
Predicted probabilities are gathered in Table 4 for four different ideal types.
Throughout the regression Table, column [1] presents our baseline model,
which includes only explanatory variables linked to the labour market (occu-
pation, income, employment status, union membership) and the usual control
variables (socio-demographic characteristics, country dummies). Columns [2]
and [3] extend the baseline model with variables related to religion. These
include the frequency of church attendance (column [2]) and the religious
denomination (column [3]). The aim is here to test the validity of arguments
emphasizing the role of religion in the formation of preferences for redis-
tribution. Column [4] extends the baseline model by incorporating dummy
variables for the social class of individuals (upper class, lower class). Our
reference category is the middle class. Finally, columns [5] and [6] test the
arguments linked to the role of subjective social mobility in the formation
of preferences for redistribution. More particularly, column [5] tests the ar-
gument of intergenerational mobility, while column [6] tests the impact of
personal mobility history on preferences for redistribution. Following our
baseline model throughout the different regressions allow us to assess the
robustness of the impact of economic variables.
4.1 The Supremacy of Economic Factors
Running an ordered logit regression on pooled country data (Table 3), it
clearly appears that the economic factors we have identified in the previous
discussion do play a crucial role in determining preferences for redistribution
(occupation, income, risk aversion). Not surprisingly, family income is a good
predictor of preferences: The higher it is, the lower the individual support for
redistribution11. This is a simple revenue effect: Wealthier individuals are
directly burdened by redistributive policies, while low income should gain
from it. The result also implies that the supposed insurance effect remains
relatively modest compared to the revenue effect.
11Notice that the result of the Chow test (H0: equal coefficients) for income quintiles
is χ2(3) = 32.37, p < 0.01, meaning that the categories of income are not evenly spaced,
so we should not treat income as an interval scale variable. It implies that an increase
from the first quintile of income to the second quintile of income does not involve a similar
decrease in the probability to favor redistribution, as an increase from the second quintile
to the third quintile of income. This is the reason why we keep entering income quintiles
separately into the regression.
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Our proxies for risk aversion are also shown to have an important effect
on preferences for redistribution. Self-employed workers, who are supposed
to be less risk averse than dependent employees, are indeed less in favor of
redistribution: Their odds of having more negative attitudes toward redistri-
bution are 1.3 times (30%) larger than dependent employees. To the contrary,
more risk averse people, proxied by public employees in our sample, appear
to be strongly and significantly in favor of redistributive policies: Their odds
of having more positive attitudes toward redistribution are 1.5 times (50%)
larger than workers in the private sector.
Finally, the type of occupation that individuals do is also a good predic-
tor of their preferences, even after controlling by income. Indeed, in all our
specifications, our occupation indicator is strongly and significantly related
to our dependent variable. We interpret the coefficients relatively to our ref-
erence category, which represents a Clerk. Thus, the negative and significant
coefficients of Managers, Professionals and Associate professionals indicate
that individuals who belong to these types of occupation are clearly less in
favour of redistribution than Clerks: based on column [1], the odds of having
more negative attitudes toward redistribution are 2.1 times (110%) larger
for Managers than for Clerks, 1.6 times (60%) larger for Professionals than
for Clerks, and 1.25 times (25%) larger for Associate professionals than for
Clerks. By opposition, Machine operators and Elementary workers are much
more in favour of redistribution than Clerks: Their odds of having more pos-
itive attitudes toward redistribution are increased by, respectively, 43% and
38% compared to Clerks. Finally, Service workers and Craftmen have atti-
tudes toward redistribution that cannot be distinguished from those of Clerks
(non significant coefficients). Results clearly suggest that a straight ordering
of occupation categories may be relevant: The less skills an individual has,
the higher his probability to favour redistributive policies. Results further
suggest that a grouping of occupation categories might be drawn, according
to the proximity of their coefficients: (i) Elementary workers and Machine
operators do have the same attitudes towards redistribution; their attitudes
differ from those of (ii) Craftman, Service workers and Clerks; finally, (iii)
Associate professionals, Professionals and Managers do form another group,
which encompasses similar attitudes towards redistribution.
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4.2 Does Religion Act as a Substitute to Redistribu-
tion?
Columns [2] and [3] introduce variables on church attendance and religious
denomination, respectively. Our results confirm the argument of Scheve and
Stasavage (2006): Religion seems to act as a substitute for redistributive
policies. Being Catholic increases the odds of having more negative attitudes
toward redistribution by 30%, while being Protestant increases it by 24%,
relative to having no religion12. According to the literature, this could be
due to an insurance effect of religious communities that lessen the social
distress of individuals, hence their need for redistribution. Indeed, Clark and
Lelkes (2005) have shown that religious individuals suffer from significantly
lower estimated losses in subjective utility after adverse life events, such
as unemployment. However, our results for religion, if not vanished, are
less clear cut when it comes to separated country regressions (Tables in the
appendix). We come back to this point in the conclusion, assembling all our
results to infer a general picture of the issue.
4.3 How Does Individuals’ Social Self-ranking Affect
their Support for Redistribution?
Column [4] introduces the subjective belonging to a social class. We try here
to capture the differentiated impact on preferences of an individual’s feeling
to belong to the upper or to the lower class. Not surprisingly, individuals
who express the feeling to belong to the upper class are less encline to favour
redistribution than those who subjectively belong to the middle class (our
reference category): Their odds of having more negative attitudes toward
redistribution is increased by 43%. Symmetrically, individuals who (subjec-
tively) belong to the lower class have a higher probability (increased by 60%)
to favor redistributive policies.
Two remarks have to be done, concerning the incorporation of this vari-
able into our model. On one hand, the subjective feeling to belong to a certain
social class is highly correlated to objective variables of job occupation and
family income. Notice indeed that the introduction of the social class vari-
able decreases the coefficients of occupation and income, although it does not
12The category “other religion” is quite negligible, representing only 3% of the popula-
tion in our sample. Including it into the regression does not change the results.
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strongly affect their significance. On the second hand, two individuals who
have the same occupation and a similar family income may have different
views of their social position. The self-positioning of an individual on the
social ladder thus captures the feeling he has regarding his relative ranking,
hence his vision of the society where he lives (this could even act as a proxy
of his social satisfaction).
4.4 The Strong Impact of Subjective Social Mobility
on Preferences for Redistribution
Columns [5] and [6] introduce the social mobility argument. Two different
specifications are tested. The first one (column [5]) tries to capture the effect
of intergenerational social mobility in a family context. Surprisingly, the coef-
ficient of job prestige is positive. Taking the result seriously, this would mean
that an individual who considers his job as more prestigious than his father’s
would yet be encline to have a more positive attitudes towards redistributive
policies (increased by 13%). Apart from intergenerational altruism, this ef-
fect could be due to a long-lasting effect of family experience (an impact of
the social position of parents on the believes and attitudes of children). This
result is consistent with the argument of Piketty (1995) about endogenous
believes of individuals.
Our second specification of social mobility (column [6]) has a more straight-
forward interpretation. We use individual perceptions of personal upward or
downward mobility within the last ten years. Our reference category en-
compasses those individuals who experienced no social mobility. Coefficients
have the expected signs: Individuals who get the feeling to have experienced
an upward mobility are less supportive to redistributive policies than peo-
ple who did not experience any mobility, whereas people who experienced
a downward mobility within the last ten years are more in favor of redis-
tribution. The odds of the former to have more negative attitudes toward
redistribution is increased by 26%, while the odds of the latter to have more
positive attitudes toward redistribution is increased by 27%. Notice again
that this is not an objective indicator of social mobility, but a subjective
one13. Although the effect is highly significant.
13For the use of objective indicators of social mobility, see the contribution of Alesina
and La Ferrara (2005).
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4.5 Socio-demographic Controls and Country Dum-
mies
Whereas being married (or living as married) has no significant effect on
preferences for redistribution, being a female clearly increases the probability
to have more favourable attitudes towards redistribution (by 41%, according
to our baseline model in column [1]). As for age, if middle age people are more
in favor of redistribution than the youth, this effect is dampened through time
(concave function).
Turning now to country dummies, the puzzle is the following. Great
Britain is our reference category. The negative and highly significant coef-
ficients for Sweden and Germany mean that living in one of those countries
leads individuals to adopt more negative attitudes towards redistribution
(the odds of negative attitudes are increased by 47% and 31%, respectively),
as compared to Brittish citizens, all other things being equal. The differ-
ence between Great Britain and France is not significant. However, country
dummies do not give any information on the reason why this is so. Indeed,
they simply have the role of “capturing” country specific potential omitted
variables, which might have an impact on the preferences of individuals for
redistribution (level of income inequality, actual redistributive policy, un-
employment rate, demographic situation, etc.). Including country dummies
into the regressions thus allows to produce unbiased estimates of our vari-
ables of interest. The fact that country dummies do have significant coeffi-
cients means that there are, indeed, differentiated national attitudes. These
dummies are like “black boxes”, whose information needs to be manually
extracted. It might thus be relevant to run separated regressions for each
country (see Section 5 below).
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Table 3: Preferences for redistribution: pooled country
Ordered logit [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Occupation
Reference category: Clerk
Manager -.763*** -.727*** -.761*** -.600*** -.764*** -.700***
(.156) (.158) (.158) (.158) (.160) (.158)
Professional -.471*** -.448*** -.522*** -.310** -.496*** -.441***
(.126) (.127) (.128) (.127) (.128) (.127)
Ass. professional -.223* -.226* -.265** -.182 -.247** -.235**
(.116) (.118) (.119) (.117) (.117) (.117)
Service worker .069 .051 .066 .068 .069 .088
(.124) (.129) (.128) (.125) (.129) (.126)
Craftman .129 .080 .146 .084 .096 .089
(.135) (.139) (.138) (.136) (.138) (.136)
Machine operator .360** .325** .382** .316* .324** .346**
(.160) (.163) (.166) (.164) (.161) (.163)
Elementary worker .327* .254 .331* .223 .351* .296*
(.176) (.183) (.177) (.175) (.186) (.177)
Income
Reference category: Family income Q5
Family income Q1 1.066*** 1.071*** 1.016*** .823*** 1.071*** 1.016***
(.122) (.125) (.125) (.127) (.125) (.125)
Family income Q2 .925*** .963*** .892*** .755*** .895*** .878***
(.119) (.122) (.122) (.123) (.122) (.122)
Family income Q3 .928*** .940*** .889*** .802*** .926*** .884***
(.108) (.111) (.111) (.111) (.110) (.111)
Family income Q4 .729*** .705*** .709*** .651*** .701*** .716***
(.106) (.109) (.108) (.108) (.108) (.108)
Employment status
Self-employed -.282** -.268* -.341** -.253* -.295** -.273*
(.138) (.142) (.140) (.138) (.140) (.140)
Publicly employed .397*** .413*** .396*** .387*** .407*** .397***
(.078) (.079) (.080) (.078) (.081) (.079)
Unions
Union membership .268*** .284*** .284*** .264*** .266*** .301***
(.084) (.086) (.086) (.085) (.085) (.085)
Demographic characteristics
Female .344*** .362*** .350*** .307*** .341*** .315***
(.074) (.077) (.076) (.075) (.077) (.075)
Age .029** .029** .030** .024* .026* .023
(.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014)
Age-sq/100 -.032** -.031** -.031** -.026* -.029** -.028*
(.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.015) (.015)
To be continued next page. . .
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Table 3: Preferences for redistribution: pooled country (cont’)
Ordered logit [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Married -.047 -.039 -.044 -.068 -.047 -.032
(.081) (.083) (.083) (.082) (.084) (.083)
Country
Reference category: Great Britain
Sweden -.386*** -.412*** -.334*** -.276*** -.408*** -.399***
(.104) (.108) (.108) (.105) (.107) (.105)
Germany -.271** -.290*** -.294** -.277*** -.310*** -.281***
(.105) (.109) (.122) (.106) (.109) (.107)
France .131 .032 .193 .148 .105 .151
(.106) (.110) (.119) (.108) (.109) (.110)
Religion
Church attendance -.098***
(.026)
Catholic -.265**
(.105)
Protestant -.221**
(.087)
Social class
Reference category: Middle class
Upper class -.356***
(.091)
Lower class .465***
(.085)
Social Mobility
Job prestige .124*
(.074)
Reference category: No mobility
Upward mobility -.235***
(.080)
Downward mobility .244***
(.094)
Number of Obs 3064 2924 2921 3026 2918 2994
Pseudo R-Squared .045 .047 .048 .052 .046 .048
Log Pseudolikelihood -4270.5 -4068.4 -4070.1 -4185.5 -4071.3 -4155.9
Chi 2 358.81 357.45 370.60 405.15 346.54 373.42
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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4.6 Predicted Probabilities
To further illustrate our results, we make use of predicted probabilities to
assess the relative importance of a few independent variables. Based on
Table 3, Model [5] with social mobility, we construct four ideal types and
compute their predicted probabilities of having different attitudes toward
redistribution. Our first two ideal types are a Male Self-employed Manager
in the Private sector (Type 1) and a Female Elementary worker employed in
the Public sector (Type 2). Results are shown in Table 4. We clearly see the
strong impact of occupation on predicted outcomes, along with the gender
dimension and risk aversion.
Table 4: Preferences for redistribution: predicted probabilities
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
Strongly Disagree .12 .02 .05 .03
Disagree .27 .06 .15 .11
Neither agree Nor disagree .25 .12 .21 .17
Agree .27 .39 .39 .41
Strongly Agree .09 .41 .19 .28
Note: Based on Table 3, Model [5]. Predicted probabilities for different
ideal types, holding all other variables constant at their means.
Type 1: Male, Self-employed, Private sector, Manager; Type 2: Fe-
male, Publicly employed, Elementary worker; Type 3: Average individ-
ual, Upward mobility; Type 4: Average individual, Downward mobility
Our last two ideal types represent an Average individual, who experiences
an Upward mobility (Type 3) or a Downward mobility (Type 4). An average
individual has about 3 to 5% probability to strongly disagree with redistri-
bution, about 11 to 15% probability to disagree with redistribution, 17 to
21% to have no idea about it, and 39 to 41% probability to agree with redis-
tribution. But most importantly, he has 28% probability to strongly agree
with redistributive policies if he experienced a Downward mobility, while this
probability falls to 19% if he experienced an Upward mobility within the last
10 years. This example illustrates the non negligible impact of personal social
mobility history on preferences for redistribution, as it was already visible
with odds ratios.
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5 Robustness Checks
We run a series of robustness checks, including binary regressions for the
pooled data, a test of the proportional odds assumption, and separated coun-
try regressions that allow to identify varying determinants of preferences for
redistribution without needing to interact each variable with each country
dummy. Results of binary regressions are given in Table 5, while Tables 6,
7, 8 and 9 in the appendix give results for the separated country regressions.
5.1 Binary Dependent Variable
As a first robustness check, we run the same pooled regressions with a binary
dependent variable. People answering that they “agree” or “strongly agree”
with the question on whether the government should reduce income differ-
ences were coded 1, whereas others (including “neither agree nor disagree”,
“disagree” and “strongly disagree” answers) were coded 0. Results are shown
in the appendix (Table 5). They remain globally unchanged.
5.2 Generalized Ordered Logit
Further, we test the validity of the parallel lines assumption, also called pro-
portional odds assumption (Long and Freese, 2006). Indeed, if the effect of
an independent variable on our dependent variable is not uniform across cat-
egories, then the parallel lines assumption is violated, leading to a fallacious
interpretation of the magnitude of the coefficient14. The test compares slope
coefficients of the J−1 binary logits implied by the ordered regression model.
In our pooled models, the Brant test indicates that the parallel regression
assumption has been violated for control variables (age, age-squared, female,
country dummies). We consider this is not a problem, as we do not inter-
pret their substantive impact. Further, there is some evidence that it has
been violated for the dummies representing publicly employed workers and
union members, although not changing the sign of coefficients but only the
magnitude of the impact according to the category of the dependent variable
considered. The same issue is found for our dummy variables representing
Catholics and a downward mobility experience. We thus run generalized
14This can be tested through the Brant test (command brant in Stata).
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ordered logit estimates15, in order to assess differentiated effects of these in-
dependent variables. However, no valuable additional information is given by
this estimation technique, which marginally affects the magnitude of coeffi-
cients (but neither their significance, nor their sign), but does not tackle the
essential message of this study16. Consequently, we remain confident with
the inferences we made in Section 4 based on ordered logit estimates.
5.3 Separated Country Regressions
We finally check for the necessity of running separated country regressions.
The pooled analyses include a fixed effect for each country to allow for differ-
ent mean levels of support for redistribution due to any number of national
characteristics, including the actual level of redistribution. However, this
does not allow the effects of the other independent variables to vary across
countries as is possible by estimating separate coefficients for each case. Run-
ning a Chow test to assess whether coefficients remain equal between coun-
tries, we find that the test is strongly significant17, so that the hypothesis
that the coefficients do not vary between countries is unvalidated. There-
fore, it is relevant to run separated country regressions. We thus estimate
the models in Table 3 separately for each of the four countries in the sample.
Tables 6, 7, 8 and 9 in the appendix report the coefficient estimates for Great
Britain, Swede, France and Germany, respectively18. We briefly discuss the
results, essentially pointing to the differences in the grouping of individuals
by occupation category19.
Notice first that in all our country estimates, the type of occupation an
15Stata user-written command gologit written by Fu (1998) and extended by Williams
(2006).
16Notice that the only coefficients that can be affected by this technique are those of
control variables, publicly employed, union membership, Catholic and downward mobil-
ity where the parallel line assumption has been violated. All other coefficients are left
unchanged.
17Given that H0: equal coefficients, χ2(66) = 170.71, p < 0.01
18In the pooled regressions, the reference category regarding the type of job occupation
was a Clerk. For national regressions, we choose to modify our reference category to
Managers, for presentational purpose. This does not affect the results at all, only the way
to present it.
19As there are no further controls in the separated country regressions, results should
be taken with cautious. The main issue is here to assess the consequences of contextual
effects on the variables of interest.
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individual exercises remains a key factor in the determination of preferences
for redistribution, along with the family income. This suggests the pooled
estimates are not driven by a couple of outlier countries. However, these
new estimates make clear that the grouping of individuals based on their
role on the labour market and relying on similar individual preferences for
redistribution highly differs from one country to another. Concerning the
structure of the society for instance, we see two major socio-political groups
in Sweden and in Germany, which are (i) the Managers (who could form a
coalition with the Professionals and the Associate professionals in Sweden),
and (ii) all other occupation categories. By contrast, there are three ma-
jor socio-political groups in Great Britain and in France, which are (i) the
Managers (associated to the Professionals and the Associate professionals
in France), (ii) the Elementary workers in Great Britain and the Craftmen
in France, and (iii) the rest of the population. This suggests that political
strategies to reform the welfare state in those countries might highly differ,
since potential social coalitions based on common interests do differ (Castan-
heira et al., 2006). Moreover, in France and in Sweden, another dimension
clearly divides the population: The distinction between the public and the
private secor, and between union members and non-union members. This is
not surprising, knowing the importance of the public sector and the power
of unions in both countries. Finally, as a specific feature of Germany, we
find that the dummy for living in former East Germany is strongly related to
the support for redistribution: The odds of being in favor of redistribution
is almost 3 times larger if an individual lives in East Germany, compared to
an individual living in West Germany. We meet up here with Alesina and
Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln (2007) result on the long lasting impact of political regimes
on collective preferences.
6 Conclusion
Building on a rapidly growing literature on the political economy of redistri-
bution, this paper proposes an empirical analysis of the determinants of in-
dividual preferences for redistributive policies. Using individual-level survey
data for four representative European countries, we run a series of regressions
specified to assess the main arguments of the literature. We systematically
compare coefficients in a meaningful way by the use of odds ratios and pre-
dicted probabilities. Consequently, (i) we are able to infer which factors are
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the most important in shaping attitudes towards redistribution, and clearly
emphasize the supremacy of economic factors. We further argue that the
position of individuals on the labour market has a direct impact on their
preferences for redistribution. This appears to be indeed the case, and to be
robust to a change in model specification. Hence, (ii) based on the results
of our regressions, we draw a grouping of individuals along this occupational
dimension. Finally, (iii) we highlight the differences between countries in
terms of the potential varying effects of explanatory variables on the prefer-
ences for redistribution; we thus give a hint on the need for diverse political
strategies while implementing national reforms. Below is a summary of our
results.
First, our analysis confirms the importance of a pure revenue effect on
preferences. Indeed, work occupation, family income, subjective social class
or expected social mobility all point to the same direction: The poorer (objec-
tively or subjectively), the more supportive to redistribution. These attitudes
towards redistribution are linked to the economic position of individuals on
the labour market. Indeed, generally speaking, Managers, Professionals and
Associate professionals form a separate group from Clerks, by expressing
a lower support for redistribution. On the other hand, Machine operators
and Elementary workers form another group, which is more supportive to
redistribution than Clerks.
Second, the revenue effect does not act similarly on all individuals. It can
be reinforced (dampened) by the risk aversion (risk willingness) of individ-
uals. Indeed, looking at the employment status of individuals, we find that
being publicly employed sensitively increases the probability to support re-
distribution, while being self-employed decreases it. This is especially true in
France and in Sweden. Hence, our proxies for risk aversion are good predic-
tors of preferences for redistribution, which is not surprising if one considers
the insurance motives of redistributive policies.
Third, the political and social backgrounds of individuals can somehow
temper this effect: We find that (i) the social position of fathers can have
a long lasting impact on the attitudes of children, (ii) the political regime
can have a long lasting effect on collective preferences. These results clearly
call for more research in the way social competition is perceived in European
countries and the way it impacts social preferences (Fong, 2001; Alesina and
Angeletos, 2005; Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln, 2007).
Fourth, one of the most empirical issue in the literature on redistribu-
tion remains the question of whether religion plays an active role in shaping
25
preferences. The conclusion is far to be obvious: According to our results, it
seems impossible to say if Catholics are more pros or cons redistribution, and
the same for Protestants since the sign of coefficients differs from one coun-
try to another. However, one can take a different view: The literature states
that religion (without looking at specific denomination) decreases the social
distress of individuals, hence decreasing the insurance motive for redistrib-
ution, potentially through network externalities. Taking the major religion
of each country, results confirm this view. Thus, Protestantism is the major
religion of Great Britain and Sweden, while Catholicism is the major religion
of France. In these countries, the effect of the major religion is indeed to de-
crease the probability to favor redistribution20. The effect is not clear-cut for
Germany, but this is not surprising given that the country is fairly divided
between both Protestantism and Catholicism. Further, looking at church
attendance reinforces the conclusion that religion could play an active role
in shaping preferences for redistribution.
Fifth, it seems that a cluster of countries might be drawn from the com-
parison of separated country regressions. Based on the socio-political groups
formed by individuals who belong to different work occupations but express
similar attitudes, we find on one hand France and Sweden, and on the other
hand Germany and Great Britain. Indeed, Managers, Professionals and Asso-
ciate professionals form an homogenous group in France and Sweden, whereas
Managers differentiate themselves from other categories of workers in Great
Britain and Germany. On the basis of personal social mobility, other cluster-
ing are possible: Great Britain and France are two countries where personal
mobility history has no impact on the demand for redistribution, whereas the
current social ranking is particularly important for lower classes. In a singu-
lar manner, French people are strongly impregnated by the social history of
their fathers. Finally, France and Sweden are relatively close regarding the
important role that takes risk aversion in the determination of preferences
along with union membership, thus opposing Great Britain and Germany
on this dimension. This country heterogeneity that undoubtoudly translates
into socio-political coalitions calls for differentiated political strategies in the
implementation of national reforms.
20However, the coefficient for Protestantism is not significant in Sweden.
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A Further Results: Robustness Checks
Table 5: Preferences for redistribution (binary): pooled country
Binary logit [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Occupation
Reference category: Clerk
Manager -.650*** -.639*** -.667*** -.501*** -.664*** -.586***
(.174) (.179) (.178) (.178) (.180) (.177)
Professional -.389*** -.354** -.444*** -.238 -.419*** -.358**
(.147) (.150) (.150) (.150) (.150) (.149)
Ass. professional -.161 -.160 -.236 -.126 -.179 -.172
(.142) (.145) (.145) (.143) (.145) (.144)
Service worker .061 .049 .041 .081 .041 .096
(.160) (.165) (.164) (.162) (.166) (.163)
Craftman .058 .011 .069 .015 .008 .027
(.164) (.169) (.169) (.166) (.169) (.167)
Machine operator .406** .388* .390* .356* .369* .386*
(.196) (.202) (.202) (.201) (.201) (.200)
Elementary worker .283 .229 .294 .172 .242 .254
(.222) (.229) (.225) (.221) (.232) (.221)
Income
Reference category: Family income Q5
Family income Q1 .917*** .957*** .872*** .682*** .918*** .889***
(.137) (.141) (.140) (.145) (.141) (.141)
Family income Q2 .825*** .869*** .801*** .678*** .801*** .798***
(.136) (.139) (.139) (.141) (.139) (.138)
Family income Q3 .873*** .897*** .843*** .753*** .879*** .845***
(.125) (.128) (.130) (.130) (.128) (.127)
Family income Q4 .664*** .644*** .661*** .589*** .635*** .657***
(.123) (.126) (.126) (.126) (.125) (.124)
Employment status
Self-employed -.288* -.273* -.369** -.256* -.308** -.277*
(.153) (.156) (.160) (.154) (.156) (.156)
Publicly employed .352*** .373*** .345*** .349*** .369*** .368***
(.092) (.093) (.093) (.093) (.094) (.093)
Unions
Union membership .149 .159 .173* .144 .159 .177*
(.098) (.101) (.101) (.100) (.100) (.100)
Demographic characteristics
Female .425*** .428*** .436*** .391*** .417*** .389***
(.087) (.089) (.090) (.088) (.090) (.089)
Age .008 .005 .008 .004 .008 .002
(.017) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018)
To be continued next page. . .
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Table 5: Preferences for redistribution (binary): pooled country
(cont’)
Binary logit [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Age-sq/100 -.009 -.004 -.007 -.005 -.009 -.005
(.018) (.019) (.019) (.019) (.019) (.019)
Married -.035 -.006 -.021 -.055 -.028 -.017
(.094) (.097) (.097) (.095) (.097) (.096)
Country
Reference category: Great Britain
Sweden -.529*** -.540*** -.489*** -.422*** -.554*** -.533***
(.130) (.135) (.134) (.132) (.133) (.131)
Germany -.274** -.282** -.262* -.274** -.302** -.274**
(.135) (.139) (.154) (.137) (.139) (.137)
France -.144 -.220 -.012 -.126 -.159 -.135
(.128) (.135) (.142) (.132) (.132) (.132)
Religion
Church attendance -.097***
(.030)
Catholic -.367***
(.114)
Protestant -.194*
(.109)
Social class
Reference category: Middle class
Upper class -.331***
(.100)
Lower class .428***
(.106)
Social Mobility
Job prestige .076
(.084)
Reference category: No mobility
Upward mobility -.178*
(.093)
Downward mobility .202*
(.111)
Number of Obs 3064 2924 2921 3026 2918 2994
Pseudo R-Squared .065 .069 .071 .074 .065 .068
Log Pseudolikelihood -1902.6 -1812.0 -1808.7 -1859.8 -1814.7 -1852.7
Chi 2 234.07 233.91 235.38 263.73 223.78 239.47
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 6: Preferences for redistribution: Great Britain
Ordered logit [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Occupation
Reference category: Manager
Professional .651* .682* .666** .595* .627* .701**
(.342) (.350) (.337) (.341) (.342) (.343)
Ass. professional .681* .811** .721* .604 .756* .625
(.380) (.411) (.369) (.381) (.402) (.382)
Clerk .637** .617* .661** .531* .722** .608**
(.310) (.322) (.308) (.309) (.319) (.310)
Service worker .652** .626* .707** .543* .666** .657**
(.308) (.323) (.307) (.314) (.322) (.311)
Craftman .690** .597* .712** .492 .639** .623**
(.297) (.316) (.299) (.304) (.308) (.297)
Machine operator .761* .931** .848* .552 .766 .713
(.463) (.466) (.467) (.473) (.467) (.472)
Elementary worker 1.259*** 1.121*** 1.296*** 1.070*** 1.325*** 1.221***
(.353) (.374) (.356) (.362) (.372) (.356)
Income
Reference category: Family income Q5
Family income Q1 1.048*** 1.218*** 1.071*** .808*** 1.083*** .979***
(.293) (.314) (.292) (.301) (.316) (.309)
Family income Q2 .888*** 1.011*** .950*** .718** .984*** .858***
(.321) (.345) (.322) (.319) (.340) (.331)
Family income Q3 .842*** .817*** .904*** .674*** .925*** .780***
(.256) (.274) (.254) (.260) (.266) (.262)
Family income Q4 .829*** .848*** .792*** .743*** .848*** .775***
(.237) (.261) (.232) (.238) (.250) (.239)
Employment status
Self-employed -.398 -.276 -.409 -.358 -.382 -.387
(.265) (.284) (.265) (.269) (.273) (.273)
Publicly employed -.042 -.058 -.052 -.057 .021 -.049
(.191) (.199) (.191) (.192) (.204) (.191)
Unions
Union membership .126 .121 .114 .148 .146 .144
(.205) (.220) (.202) (.204) (.209) (.205)
Demographic characteristics
Female .122 .138 .129 .085 .070 .083
(.170) (.181) (.169) (.173) (.178) (.170)
Age .018 .025 .031 .014 .006 .009
(.026) (.027) (.026) (.026) (.028) (.025)
Age-sq/100 -.021 -.027 -.031 -.017 -.011 -.014
(.025) (.026) (.026) (.026) (.027) (.025)
To be continued next page. . .
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Table 6: Preferences for redistribution: Great Britain (cont’)
Ordered logit [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Married -.068 -.018 -.065 -.051 -.049 -.041
(.175) (.182) (.174) (.178) (.185) (.178)
Religion
Church attendance -.074
(.046)
Catholic .680**
(.314)
Protestant -.384**
(.170)
Social class
Reference category: Middle class
Upper class -.327
(.215)
Lower class .398**
(.177)
Social Mobility
Job prestige .247
(.167)
Reference category: No mobility
Upward mobility -.053
(.193)
Downward mobility .105
(.199)
Number of Obs 674 609 674 659 621 657
Pseudo R-Squared .030 .033 .038 .034 .031 .028
Log Pseudolikelihood -870.6 -780.8 -863.5 -845.4 -807.6 -846.8
Chi 2 46.66 50.11 65.06 52.93 44.73 43.67
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 7: Preferences for redistribution: Sweden
Ordered logit [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Occupation
Reference category: Manager
Professional .168 .082 .157 .122 .060 .083
(.373) (.374) (.374) (.378) (.375) (.366)
Ass. professional .600 .516 .596 .361 .489 .471
(.367) (.370) (.367) (.374) (.370) (.358)
Clerk 1.045*** .997** 1.028*** .715* .861** .950**
(.392) (.395) (.393) (.401) (.391) (.386)
Service worker 1.012*** .949** 1.004*** .631 .895** .918**
(.380) (.382) (.380) (.390) (.384) (.372)
Craftman 1.114*** 1.026** 1.117*** .677 .953** .931**
(.405) (.406) (.406) (.412) (.411) (.399)
Machine operator 1.473*** 1.375*** 1.470*** 1.144*** 1.264*** 1.414***
(.406) (.409) (.405) (.421) (.407) (.399)
Elementary worker 1.084** 1.063** 1.063** .574 1.026** .908**
(.429) (.433) (.426) (.431) (.439) (.421)
Income
Reference category: Family income Q5
Family income Q1 .857*** .804*** .859*** .683*** .870*** .849***
(.222) (.224) (.223) (.225) (.226) (.223)
Family income Q2 1.060*** 1.054*** 1.054*** .921*** 1.077*** 1.038***
(.229) (.231) (.229) (.230) (.234) (.234)
Family income Q3 .820*** .772*** .821*** .759*** .822*** .787***
(.215) (.219) (.216) (.216) (.219) (.221)
Family income Q4 .595*** .562*** .617*** .504** .572*** .573***
(.203) (.205) (.204) (.208) (.205) (.207)
Employment status
Self-employed -.381 -.439 -.401 -.288 -.348 -.321
(.279) (.283) (.279) (.267) (.283) (.273)
Publicly employed .528*** .509*** .501*** .540*** .549*** .528***
(.137) (.139) (.140) (.139) (.140) (.139)
Unions
Union membership .387** .370** .407** .361** .368** .480***
(.182) (.183) (.183) (.181) (.184) (.185)
Demographic characteristics
Female .373*** .371*** .388*** .341** .381*** .337**
(.142) (.144) (.143) (.141) (.143) (.144)
Age .041 .046 .041 .031 .046* .031
(.027) (.028) (.028) (.028) (.028) (.028)
Age-sq/100 -.041 -.046 -.040 -.033 -.044 -.036
(.028) (.029) (.028) (.028) (.029) (.028)
To be continued next page. . .
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Table 7: Preferences for redistribution: Sweden (cont’)
Ordered logit [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Married -.241 -.307* -.242 -.248 -.243 -.209
(.160) (.163) (.161) (.161) (.164) (.163)
Religion
Church attendance .004
(.064)
Catholic .294
(.438)
Protestant -.223
(.145)
Social class
Reference category: Middle class
Upper class -.688***
(.161)
Lower class .534***
(.193)
Social Mobility
Job prestige -.217
(.142)
Reference category: No mobility
Upward mobility -.318**
(.153)
Downward mobility .319*
(.183)
Number of Obs 878 860 878 869 851 862
Pseudo R-Squared .064 .065 .065 .081 .065 .071
Log Pseudolikelihood -1218.7 -1188.2 -1217.1 -1182.3 -1180.1 -1186.7
Chi 2 157.64 155.99 162.42 184.42 158.85 168.98
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 8: Preferences for redistribution: France
Ordered logit [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Occupation
Reference category: Manager
Professional .160 .126 .094 .167 .070 .138
(.202) (.207) (.205) (.209) (.212) (.212)
Ass. professional .314 .213 .236 .252 .251 .258
(.204) (.210) (.207) (.212) (.215) (.215)
Clerk .513** .415 .476* .405 .508* .491*
(.252) (.256) (.253) (.259) (.259) (.259)
Service worker .714** .544 .677** .620* .616* .675**
(.324) (.357) (.341) (.336) (.337) (.334)
Craftman 1.070*** .853** 1.049*** .904** .989** .971**
(.385) (.418) (.384) (.397) (.393) (.398)
Machine operator .953*** .707** .852** .810** .919** .838**
(.343) (.356) (.351) (.349) (.357) (.345)
Elementary worker .621 .219 .464 .510 .300 .390
(.608) (.640) (.633) (.616) (.800) (.624)
Income
Reference category: Family income Q5
Family income Q1 1.252*** 1.275*** 1.262*** 1.061*** 1.318*** 1.239***
(.221) (.228) (.223) (.248) (.224) (.230)
Family income Q2 .940*** .960*** .943*** .812*** .896*** .894***
(.209) (.212) (.210) (.231) (.216) (.219)
Family income Q3 .992*** 1.032*** 1.028*** .922*** .958*** .918***
(.208) (.215) (.207) (.230) (.213) (.216)
Family income Q4 .616*** .546** .628*** .546** .610*** .614***
(.215) (.219) (.216) (.229) (.218) (.223)
Employment status
Self-employed -.511* -.546* -.507* -.468* -.519* -.500*
(.274) (.279) (.277) (.283) (.272) (.292)
Publicly employed .480*** .508*** .448*** .462*** .464*** .481***
(.133) (.136) (.134) (.134) (.136) (.134)
Unions
Union membership .275** .338** .276** .267** .280** .280**
(.133) (.137) (.134) (.133) (.134) (.134)
Demographic characteristics
Female .366*** .389*** .416*** .353*** .366*** .347***
(.127) (.132) (.131) (.129) (.129) (.129)
Age .053 .058* .052 .063 .040 .074
(.033) (.033) (.032) (.040) (.036) (.052)
Age-sq/100 -.061* -.066* -.056 -.073 -.045 -.087
(.037) (.036) (.036) (.046) (.041) (.062)
To be continued next page. . .
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Table 8: Preferences for redistribution: France (cont’)
Ordered logit [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Married .093 .174 .180 .049 .073 .105
(.154) (.158) (.157) (.159) (.161) (.161)
Religion
Church attendance -.116***
(.044)
Catholic -.376***
(.125)
Protestant .091
(.430)
Social class
Reference category: Middle class
Upper class -.072
(.173)
Lower class .381**
(.156)
Social Mobility
Job prestige .342***
(.125)
Reference category: No mobility
Upward mobility -.081
(.135)
Downward mobility .252
(.180)
Number of Obs 996 939 984 988 954 968
Pseudo R-Squared .048 .052 .050 .050 .050 .050
Log Pseudolikelihood -1396.8 -1319.2 -1379.2 -1383.4 -1332.6 -1354.1
Chi 2 129.79 131.97 137.73 133.46 130.75 130.68
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 9: Preferences for redistribution: Germany
Ordered logit [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Occupation
Reference category: Manager
Professional 1.207** 1.207** 1.098* 1.222** 1.502*** 1.157**
(.473) (.470) (.615) (.479) (.499) (.493)
Ass. professional 1.303*** 1.295*** 1.333** 1.190*** 1.409*** 1.208***
(.445) (.445) (.598) (.445) (.459) (.459)
Clerk 1.580*** 1.545*** 1.734*** 1.458*** 1.706*** 1.407***
(.476) (.479) (.603) (.477) (.495) (.490)
Service worker 1.291** 1.242** 1.533** 1.235** 1.393** 1.149**
(.532) (.540) (.709) (.542) (.565) (.541)
Craftman 1.524*** 1.518*** 1.588*** 1.428*** 1.649*** 1.338***
(.451) (.455) (.555) (.456) (.466) (.464)
Machine operator 1.551*** 1.510*** 1.829*** 1.392*** 1.505*** 1.382***
(.493) (.496) (.619) (.499) (.521) (.515)
Elementary worker 2.131*** 2.141*** 2.358*** 1.865*** 2.303*** 2.030***
(.639) (.637) (.711) (.652) (.674) (.634)
Income
Reference category: Family income Q5
Family income Q1 .646* .692** .588 .494 .531 .558
(.353) (.349) (.419) (.360) (.356) (.353)
Family income Q2 .275 .307 .271 .264 .136 .235
(.288) (.292) (.314) (.299) (.295) (.303)
Family income Q3 .773*** .775*** .779*** .726*** .739*** .790***
(.243) (.244) (.278) (.260) (.253) (.258)
Family income Q4 .577** .598** .588** .604** .425* .613**
(.252) (.250) (.289) (.253) (.256) (.261)
Employment status
Self-employed .264 .262 .156 .176 .185 .216
(.403) (.401) (.518) (.403) (.414) (.412)
Publicly employed .084 .100 .153 .068 -.033 .040
(.230) (.232) (.278) (.230) (.233) (.235)
Unions
Union membership .262 .270 .321 .281 .265 .309
(.225) (.228) (.259) (.228) (.235) (.226)
Demographic characteristics
Female .598*** .602*** .551** .579*** .642*** .594***
(.213) (.212) (.247) (.216) (.218) (.214)
Age .004 -.004 -.008 .011 -.005 -.003
(.047) (.047) (.055) (.048) (.049) (.048)
Age-sq/100 -.001 .011 .012 -.008 .009 .002
(.055) (.055) (.063) (.056) (.057) (.056)
To be continued next page. . .
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Table 9: Preferences for redistribution: Germany (cont’)
Ordered logit [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Married -.173 -.116 -.187 -.203 -.151 -.179
(.212) (.218) (.240) (.221) (.216) (.218)
Region
East Germany 1.054*** .954*** .879*** .966*** 1.145*** .956***
(.191) (.195) (.264) (.197) (.203) (.195)
Religion
Church attendance -.146*
(.078)
Catholic .709*
(.369)
Protestant .840**
(.373)
Social class
Reference category: Middle class
Upper class -.048
(.234)
Lower class .433**
(.220)
Social Mobility
Job prestige .009
(.193)
Reference category: No mobility
Upward mobility -.470**
(.195)
Downward mobility .198
(.221)
Number of Obs 516 516 385 510 492 507
Pseudo R-Squared .067 .069 .064 .070 .073 .075
Log Pseudolikelihood -697.8 -696.1 -527.2 -687.5 -661.3 -679.8
Chi 2 100.31 101.87 75.62 106.49 103.67 108.81
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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B Descriptive Statistics
Table 10: Summary statistics
Variable n % N
Government should reduce income differences?
Strongly disagree 271 5 5037
Disagree 706 14 5037
Neither agree nor disagree 906 18 5037
Agree 1878 37 5037
Strongly agree 1276 25 5037
Occupation
Manager 400 9 4277
Professional 780 18 4277
Associate professional 929 22 4277
Clerk 568 13 4277
Service worker 518 12 4277
Agricultural worker 113 3 4277
Craftman 466 11 4277
Machine operator 298 7 4277
Elementary worker 205 5 4277
Income
Family income Q1 1288 28 4586
Family income Q2 871 19 4586
Family income Q3 901 20 4586
Family income Q4 770 17 4586
Family income Q5 756 16 4586
Employment status
Self-employed 352 9 3719
Publicly employed 1591 37 4280
Unions
Union membership 1523 33 4613
Demographic characteristics
Female 2572 49 5275
Married 3191 61 5237
Religion
Catholic 1631 33 4940
Protestant 1792 36 4940
Other religion 169 3 4940
No religion 1348 27 4940
Church attendance
Never 2085 42 5009
Once a year 1246 25 5009
Several times a year 898 18 5009
To be continued next page. . .
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Table 10: Summary statistics (cont’)
Variable n % N
Once a month 240 5 5009
2-3 times a month 202 4 5009
Once a week 338 7 5009
Social class
Upper class 1206 23 5174
Lower class 1392 27 5174
Middle class 2576 50 5174
Social mobility
Job prestige > father 2170 46 4717
Upward mobility 1690 33 5094
Downward mobility 1143 22 5094
No mobility 2261 44 5094
Country
Great Britain 804 15 5275
Sweden 1150 22 5275
France 1889 36 5275
Germany 1432 27 5275
incl. East Germany 511 36 1432
Mean Std. Dev. N
Age (17 to 96 years old) 48 16.45 5257
Source: ISSP 1999 - Social Inequality III
38
0
10
20
30
40
Pe
rce
nt
Strongly disagree Disagree Neither Nor Agree Strongly agree
Government should reduce income differences
Figure 1: Attitudes towards redistribution, full sample
0
50
0
50
SD D NN A SA SD D NN A SA
SD D NN A SA SD D NN A SA
Germany Great Britain
Sweden FrancePe
rce
nt
Government should reduce income differences
Graphs by country
Figure 2: Attitudes towards redistribution, by country
39
C Classification of Occupations
For cross-national comparisons, only a few skill level categories have been
identified by EUROSTAT21 (Statistical Office of the European Communi-
ties). ISCO-88 (International Standard Classification of Occupations, 1988
version) uses four skill levels to define the broad structure of the classifica-
tion at its most aggregate level, the major groups. These four skill levels are
partly operationalised in terms of the International Standard Classification
of Education (ISCED) and partly in terms of the job-related formal training
which may be used to develop the skill level of persons who will carry out
such jobs (Table 11). The decisive factor for determining how an occupation
should be classified is the nature of the skills that are required to carry out
the tasks and duties of the corresponding jobs.
Table 11: Definition of Skill Levels
ISCO skill level ISCED categories
First skill level ISCED category 1: primary education
Second skill level ISCED category 2 and 3: first and second stages of sec-
ondary education
Third skill level ISCED category 5: education starting at the age of 17 or 18,
which leads to an award not equivalent to a first university
degree
Fourth skill level ISCED category 6 and 7: education starting at the age of 17
or 18, which leads to a university or postgraduate university
degree (or the equivalent)
Note: Category 4 of ISCED has been deliberately left without content, since it
is now included in category 5. Source: ILO (1990)
Five of the eight major groups (groups 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8) are considered to
be at the same skill level; they are distinguished by reference to broad skill
specialisation groups. The definition of major groups 1 and 0 do not refer to
skill levels, because other aspects of the type of work were considered more
important as similarity criteria: policy making and management functions,
and military duties, respectively (Table 12).
21This section largely relies on the EUROSTAT (1994) guideline written by Margaret
Birch and Peter Elias.
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Table 12: Definition of Occupation Major Groups
Major Group of Occupations ISCO skill level
1 Legislators, senior officials and managers −
2 Professionals Fourth level
3 Technicians and associate professionals Third level
4 Clerks Second level
5 Service workers and shop and market sales workers Second level
6 Skill agricultural and fishery workers Second level
7 Craft and related workers Second level
8 Plant and machine operators and assemblers Second level
9 Elementary occupations First level
0 Armed forces −
Note: We exclude from our regressions individuals who are attached to group
0 Armed forces. Source: ILO (1990)
D Econometric Specification
In our regressions, we aim to estimate what determines the individual atti-
tudes towards redistribution. However, individual attitudes are coded as a
discrete choice variable. Hence, our true dependent variable (i.e. the contin-
uous level of utility) is not directely observed. This leads us to estimate a
categorical dependent variable model.
Latent Variable It is assumed that the true dependent variable is continu-
ous, though unobservable. We consider that a latent variable is underlying
the model:
y∗i = x
′
iβ + εi (3)
for i = 1, ..., N where xi is a vector of observations on a set of explanatory
variables, β is a vector of unknown parameters, εi is a random error term
independently distributed with distribution function F (to be defined below).
Distribution Function While y∗i is unobserved, yi is observed. The ob-
served dependent variable, which is discrete, is thus taking one of the values
1, 2, ..., J.
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yi is related to y
∗
i as follows:
yi =

1 if y∗i < α1
2 if α1 ≤ y∗i < α2
...
J if αJ−1 ≤ y∗i
(4)
with αj being additional parameters such that α1 < α2 < . . . < αJ−1
acting as cut points for intervals into which a particular observation falls.
Hence, the dependent variable y is ordinal and αj are treated as parameters
to be estimated.
Set of Probabilities The full set of probabilities of the possible outcomes
is the following:
Pr[yi = j|x] = F (αj − x′iβ)− F (αj−1 − x
′
iβ) (5)
for all j, assuming that α0 = −∞ and αJ = +∞, where F is the cumulative
distribution function for error term.
Maximum Likelihood Estimator The usual estimator for this type of
model is the Maximum Likelihood estimator. The log-likelihood for the
model is:
logL =
N∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
yij log[F (αj − x′iβ)− F (αj−1 − x
′
iβ)] (6)
maximized with respect to β, α1, α2, . . . , αJ−1.
Ordered Probit / Logit Model From this, the Ordered Probit model
(Aitchison and Silvey, 1957; Amemiya, 1981; Winship and Mare, 1984) sim-
ply assumes that the cumulative distribution function is a standard Normal
(with the scale normalization σ = 1):
εi ∼ N(0, 1) (7)
Hence, the F becomes Φ in equations (3) and (4), with:
Φ(ε) =
e−
ε2
2√
2pi
(8)
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And the Ordered Logit model assumes that the cumulative distribution
function is Logistic:
εi ∼ G(0, pi
2
3
) (9)
Hence, the F becomes Λ in equations (3) and (4), with:
Λ(ε) =
1
1 + e−ε
(10)
In our study, we preferably use ordered logit than ordered probit esti-
mation techniques. Indeed, ordered logit estimates allow to compute odds
ratios that ease the interpretation of coefficients.
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